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ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE BEFORE THE FAA
AND NTSB: PROBLEMS, TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS
J. SCOTT HAMILTON*
T IS VIRTUALLY impossible for an individual or a business
to participate legally in any aspect of civil aviation without first
obtaining one or more certificates from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a division of the United States Department
of Transportation (DOT). The FAA certifies not only flight crews,
including pilots, flight engineers, and navigators,1 but also ground
support personnel, including air traffic control tower operators, air-
craft dispatchers, aircraft mechanics and repairmen, and parachute
riggers Moreover, the FAA certifies almost every conceivable form
of aviation business, including domestic, flag, and supplemental air
carriers and commercial operators of large aircraft,' air travel clubs
using large airplanes,' scheduled air carriers using helicopters, '
foreign air carriers operating within the United States,' operators of
helicopters hoisting loads externally,' air taxi and commercial op-
erators of small aircraft,' agricultural aircraft operators," airports
* J. Scott Hamilton is President of Hamilton & Hill, P.C., in Denver, Colorado.
He is an adjunct professor at the University of Denver College of Law and an
assistant professor at Metropolitan State College. Mr. Hamilton holds a J.D.
from the University of Denver College of Law and an L.L.M. from Southern
Methodist University School of Law.
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serving certificated air carriers,"0 pilot training schools," aircraft
repair stations,'2 aviation maintenance technician schools," and
parachute lofts," along with both ground and flight instructors. 5
In addition to obtaining an operating certificate, each flight crew
member and air traffic controller must obtain an aviation medical
certificate from the FAA.
The FAA's duties also include promulgation and enforcement
of the body of administrative law known as the Federal Aviation
Regulations" pursuant to the authority delegated it by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958." In instances of suspected non-compliance
with these regulations the FAA may impose fines (known as "civil
penalties") against the violator" or place the certificates of those
involved in jeopardy of suspension or revocation." Additionally,
when the FAA suspects that the holder of an aviation medical
certificate is unqualified it may act to suspend or revoke that
certificate."
The procedures followed and appellate recourse available to
the accused in civil penalty actions and in actions against FAA
operating or medical certificates have been thoroughly discussed
in the literature." This paper will not deal with these fundamentals;
rather, it will discuss recent developments that have occurred in
the field and will focus on certain unique and often vexing dilem-
mas typically encountered by the practicing attorney in represent-
10 Id. 55 139.1-.127.
"1 Id. 5 141.1-.101.
12 Id. 5 145.1-.105.
3 Id. 5 147.1-.45.
14 1d. § 149.1-.27.
Is Id. 5 143.1-.23, 61.181-.201.
"6Id. 5 1.1-199.31.
1749 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976) (amended 1978).
18Id. 5 1471.
1I Id. § 1429.
2" Id.
"Hamilton, Appellate Practice in Air Safety Proceedings, 10 Sw. U. L. REy.
247 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton, Appellate Practice]; Hamilton, Ad-
ministrative Practice in Aviation Medical Proceedings, 26 EMORY L.J. 565
(1977); Kovarick, Procedures Before the Federal Aviation Administration, 42
J. AIR L. & CoM. 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kovarick]; Yodice, Airman
Certification and Enforcement Procedures, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 281 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Yodice]; Mathis, The Traffic Cop of the Skies-FAA En-
forcement Actions, 35 J. AIR L. & COM. 40 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mathis].
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ing people and businesses threatened with such FAA actions. This
subject is especially timely and of particular concern to the aviation
industry because the Administrator of the FAA has instituted a
"get tough" enforcement campaign characterized by vitriolic pro-
nouncementsi and vindictive actions."
That [enforcement] system is out of date in several important
respects. For one thing, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 set a
maximum penalty of $1,000 for each violation of Federal Avia-
tion Regulations. Now, more than 40 years later, the penalty is
still $1,000. At those prices, many operators break the rules as a
matter of course, and write off any penalty as an inconvenient but
bearable part of the cost of doing business. I want that maximum
penalty high enough to hurt. I want it raised to $25,000. And I
want criminal penalties for the worst violators of safety regula-
tions. A driver who endangers the lives of others by breaking the
traffic laws is punished as a criminal, and I see no reason why a
pilot should be treated any differently. My Chief Counsel has
drafted legislative proposals doing both these things. The Office
of Management and Budget has approved these proposals, and the
Department of Transportation will soon send them to Congress.
Most of the measures I'm going to outline for you today, however,
can be taken immediately, or in the very near future, by adminis-
trative rather than legislative action ....
A violation that usually carried a certain fine . . . may cost an
airman more . . . Administrative law judges employed by the
National Transportation Safety Board have frequently reduced the
penalties the FAA has imposed on unsafe airmen--even when the
FAA has been found to be correct on both the facts and the law.
In the past, we have appealed only the most egregious cases in
which penalties have been reduced. In the future, the FAA will
appeal all unwarranted reductions . . . . The law gives me great
power to deal with such cases-including the power to close down
airlines and seize aircraft if necessary. In the past, [closing down
airlines and seizing aircraft has been done] seldom and with re-
luctance. I will [do so] whenever air safety demands it, and I will
do so without any reluctance at all ....
Address by FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond to the National Aviation Club
in Washington, D.C. (March 16, 1979).
As we gear up for tougher enforcement, it has to be considered
crude and, at first, a not-so-well organized effort .... We are going
to get better at it. The FAA is a slow organization to get tuned,
but when it gets going, it grinds exceedingly fine.... [Enforcement]
is totally inadequate if it is thought that our role in life is to tell
people how to fly safely, as coaches and teachers. That is not FAA's
role, although it has been represented that way in the past.
FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond, quoted in BUSINESS AVIATION, Dec. 31,
1979, at 213.
FAA Administrator Langhorne Bond, charging that the commu-
ter airline safety record "is unacceptable," told commuter operators
last week that "FAA plans to continue beefed-up inspections and
will continue to seek heavy fines for ground operators guilty of
rule violations." In what was viewed as a hard-line speech at the
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I. ENFORCEMENT
The FAA's procedure of enforcement, whether the penalty
sought is a civil fine or suspension or revocation of an aviator's
certificate, is characterized by the successive impalements of both
the accused and his counsel upon the septic horns of a herd of
unsavory dilemmas. I will identify and discuss several of these
dilemmas, and it may aid the reader in understanding each of them
if first the scene is set and it is determined who released these
despicable beasts from their cage and with what key.
The United States Constitution, through its Bill of Rights, makes
certain guarantees to the people. For example, the Fourth Amend-
ment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a person to be a witness
against himself, and the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused
the right to counsel. These rights, as interpreted in court decisions
through the years, are available to the accused in criminal pro-
ceedings, but because of a curious distinction between actions de-
nominated criminal and civil in nature these rights are, for the
most part, denied to those who are accused or the subject of an
opening of FAA's commuter safety symposium last week in Wash-
ington, Bond said that in 1978 commuters had 3.93 accidents per
100,000 hours of flight, compared to a figure of .55 for local service
carriers. Although Bond conceded that many operators are com-
plying with new Part 135 regulations, he said that, "I look forward
to the day when I can impose heavier penalties on those who re-
peatedly and willfully endanger safety."
BUSINESS AVIATION, Jan. 21, 1980, at 18.
23 FAA told the Delta County Airport in Escanaba, Mich., that as of
May 7 no airline may operate into the airport. North Central has
been operating 6 flights daily into Delta County. It is highly unusual
for FAA to take action as stringent as pulling an airport's operat-
ing certificate. The move was described as part of FAA Adminis-
trator Langhorne Bond's "get tough" enforcement policy.
BUSINEss AVIATION, May 7, 1979, at 148.
"As part of a get-tough policy on violators, the FAA has asked its 11 domestic
regions to issue press releases on some of their enforcement actions. The idea
is to discourage potential violators through the threat of public humiliation ... 
FLYING, March 1980, at 19.
FAA crackdown on violators of the FARs is visible in the in-
creased number of very large fines levied on air carriers and the
withdrawal of operating certificates in addition to fining of com-
muters. Also, the FAA apparently believes negative publicity will
reduce the number of violations. The FAA regions have been issu-
ing press releases describing incidents involving suspensions of
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investigation in the administrative process." The irony of this denial
is that a person accused in a civil proceeding is confronted with
many of the same dilemmas that confront a person accused in a
criminal proceeding. In addition, the potential for many of the
same abuses of fights exists in both the criminal and civil contexts.
This is particularly true with respect to FAA proceedings in which
an accused is even denied some of the rights allowed to participants
in other civil proceedings.
A. Investigation
In an FAA enforcement proceeding, a suspect and his counsel
first encounter a number of unsavory dilemmas during the FAA's
investigation process. Investigation of alleged violations of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) is the duty of FAA inspec-
tors assigned either to Air Carrier District Offices (ACDO), Gen-
eral Aviation District Offices (GADO), or Flight Standards District
Offices (FSDO). These inspectors are the agency's "cops"; they
bear the same relationship to the FARs as policemen bear to the
criminal law. In addition to investigation of FAR violations, the
FAA inspectors' duties include the testing of applicants for the
pilot certificates for FAR violations. The press releases, which have
covered minor incidents by student pilots as well as more serious
ones by professional pilots, are distributed to the news media
nationwide.
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION, Jan., 1980, at 24.
"The FAA proposed a $1.5 million civil penalty against Braniff Airways for
alleged violations of government aircraft-maintenance rules. . . . The $1.5 mil-
lion penalty would be the largest ever levied by the FAA..... ThE WALL
STREET J., Nov. 7, 1979, at 8.
2 It is the rule in the federal system that an extension of the "Miranda doc-
trine to situations where there is no criminal charge under investigation and
where a statement is given by a person who has not been in any way deprived
of his freedom would be wholly unwarranted." F. J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969). See also
United States v. Casias, 306 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1969); United States v.
Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968). The National Transportation
Safety Board has held that these procedural safeguards "are not applicable to
civil proceedings, or to instances where admissions are made during a non-
custodial investigation." Administrator v. Trier, 2 N. Trans. S. Dec. 379 (1973).
Accord Administrator v. Gable, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 654, 656 (1969); Adminis-
trator v. Smith, 44 C.A.B. 864, 865 (1966); Administrator v. Brubacker, 19
C.A.B. 885, 887 (1954). Contrast this line of cases with the parallel line of cases
culminating in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), which found a
warrantless administrative inspection conducted by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) unconstitutional as being violative of the Fourth
Amendment.
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various certificates and pilots' licenses issued by the FAA and the
investigating of aircraft accidents. These duties, however, are also
similar to the duties of ordinary cops who typically administer
practical tests to applicants for drivers' licenses and investigate
automobile accidents. You may be assured that the FAA "cops"
take their enforcement responsibilities every bit as seriously as the
cops on the beat. As diligent, dedicated enforcers of the body of
law entrusted to their care they are subject to the same pressures
and incentives that have given rise to the well-known abuses of the
constitutional rights of persons accused under the criminal law.'
Because many of the constitutional protections that have been
recognized to favor those accused of crimes have been held in-
applicable to administrative cases, the zeal of these "cops" is
virtually unchecked."
1. The Self-Incriminating Dilemma.
It has been held that in FAA proceedings the accused enjoys
no privilege against self-incrimination and that the investigator is
not required to give persons suspected of FAR violations the pre-
interrogation "Miranda" warnings required in criminal investiga-
tions." The suspect is never advised before questioning that he is
entitled to counsel, that he has the right to remain silent, or that
statements that he makes will invariably be used against him in the
prosecution of an enforcement action. Thus the suspect in FAA
proceedings is in the same dilemma as the pre-Miranda criminal
suspect. Lord Devlin's famous comment of more than thirty years
ago applies equally well today to these cases as it did then to crimi-
nal prosecutions:
It is probable that even today, when there is much less ignorance
about these matters than formerly, there is still a general belief
that you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or
at least that it will be worse for you if you do not. 8
2 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
26See note 24 supra.
271d. But see Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), which clearly
implies that the Miranda doctrine applies to any investigation, civil or criminal,
where there exists the possibility that the investigation will result in criminal
prosecution.
2'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966), citing Devlin, The
Criminal Prosecution in England 32 (1958).
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The Supreme Court of the United States observed in Miranda:
It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to
an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated,
that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained
or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will
bode ill . .. ."
Those entangled in the FAA process, usually ordinary citizens, are
less likely to be informed of their rights than the criminally ac-
cused, despite the frequent repetition of the Miranda warnings in
the many popular cops-and-robbers television shows. Yet the po-
tential for abuse of constitutional rights voiced in Miranda exists
in administrative proceedings. One writer examining this dilemma
in the similar context of an Internal Revenue Service investigation
stated:
To obtain this evidence, the investigator has at his disposal tech-
niques that are fully as coercive in their own way as those used
by the police in custodial interrogations. Moreover, the tax investi-
gator can be dangerously deceptive because his position does not
carry the presumptive threat and built-in warning attending the
FBI agent or local policeman. Thus, a false sense of security and
the desire to maintain that security through cooperation combine
to pressure the taxpayer to disclose all. This kind of pressure is in
no way dependent upon custody."0
The unfortunate person who is the subject of an FAA investi-
gation will find himself caught in a self-incrimination dilemma. He
may refuse to submit to FAA interrogation, followed by the un-
pleasant result that the FAA decides that he has an uncooperative
attitude and should be targeted for an especially harsh sanction.
On the other hand, he may submit to FAA interrogation. It has
been this author's experience that the only practical effect of the
suspect's cooperation in these proceedings is to aid the FAA in
proving the case against him through damaging admissions, which
frequently prove the prosecutor's otherwise unprovable case.
2. The Presentation of Logbook Dilemma.
A pilot is required by the regulations to present his logbook for
29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468.
0 Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. REv.
690, 697 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Extending Miranda].
19811
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inspection upon the request of the FAA, the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB or Board), or any state or local law en-
forcement officer.' The evidence thus obtained by the government
can be used not only in the prosecution of an administrative en-
forcement action, but may also give rise to criminal charges if any
apparently false statements appear therein.' This possibility of self-
incrimination does not preclude administrative penalization of the
pilot who refuses to present his logbook on Fifth Amendment
grounds. The suspect is therefore presented with another dilemma
-whether to present his logbook, which possibly will provide the
FAA with evidence useful in prosecuting the airman (and even
possibly provide the basis for a felony complaint), or refuse to pre-
sent the logbook, which is in itself a regulatory violation subject to
prosecution.
3. The Absense of Counsel Dilemma.
Confronted by an FAA inspector's questioning, a suspect is not
likely to consider that he should first obtain legal counsel before
making any statements." If this thought did occur, it is almost cer-
tain that the suspect's next thought would be: "But if I insist on
talking to my lawyer, the investigator will assume that I must have
something to hide. I might avoid punitive action by appearing to
have nothing to hide."'  Thus the suspect is presented with the
absence of counsel dilemma. Should he insist on speaking to an
attorney before talking with the FAA and have the inspector note
this "bad attitude" that confirms that the suspect did something
3-14 C.F.R. S 61.51(d)(1) (1980).
32 18 U.S.C. S 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a
request may be the person who most needs counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 471. See also note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
' "Those agencies whose cooperation is highly important to the success of
the subject's business have a further lever, for there is substantial incentive to
stay within the good graces of such an agency." Extending Miranda, supra note
30, at 705-06.
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wrong? Or should he talk to the FAA without counsel and risk
making irreparably damaging admissions?
If an attorney has an ongoing professional relationship with
aviators and aviation businesses, he may do them a good service
by forewarning them to make it a standard operating procedure to
call him and confer prior to making any statements to FAA in-
vestigators encountered in this context. This is, of course, a rare
opportunity and it is far more likely that the first contact counsel
will have with the suspect will be after the damaging admissions
have been made. At that point there is often little the attorney
can do to affect the outcome of the proceedings beyond simple
plea-bargaining in hope of reducing the penalty that will be
assessed for the inevitable conviction.' For this reason, the initial
encounter between the suspect and the agency's investigator may
be the single most crucial moment in the entire proceeding. The
individual's on-the-spot decisions whether to first call his attorney
and whether to discuss matters with the investigator, if inadvisedly
made, may irretrievably destroy any chance of a successful defense
of subsequent charges. Yet alone and unadvised, it is almost certain
that the suspect will make the wrong decision.'
4. The Accident Reporting and Investigation Dilemma.
The operator,' of an aircraft involved in an accidentu is required
to notify the NTSB immediately by the most expeditious means
available." The NTSB then has the duty to investigate the accident
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Supreme Court of the
United States observed with respect to a criminal case:
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, we held that every person
accused of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer
at trial. The rule sought by the State here, however, would make
the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the
"right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow
thing [if] for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured
by pretrial examination.
378 U.S. at 487-88.
- See generally Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion,
82 HARv. L. REV. 42 (1968).
" "Operator means any person who causes or authorizes the operation of an
aircraft, such as the owner, lessee, or bailee of an aircraft." 49 C.F.R. § 830.2
(1979).
38 49 C.F.R. S 830.2 (1979) defines those aircraft accidents for which notifica-
tion is required.
$949 C.F.R. 5 830.5 (1979).
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and determine the facts, conditions, circumstances, and causes of
the accident."0 Some field investigative authority has been delegated
by the Board to the FAA."1 Many enforcement actions arise out of
the investigation of these aviation accidents,' yet statements made
by the operator in filing the required report and in cooperating
with the investigation may later be admitted into evidence in an
enforcement proceeding arising out of the accident.' Thus the
self-incrimination dilemma raises its ugly head in yet another guise.
Another vexing problem that sometimes presents itself involves
what is known as the "Lindstram Doctrine." In Administrator v.
Lindstram" the Board held that when a person is accused of careless
or reckless operation5 that allegedly resulted in an aircraft acci-
dent, the Administrator can establish a prima facie case simply by
proving the fact of the accident, supported by some evidence that
rules out causes other than pilot error, such as malfunction of an
aircraft system or component or weather conditions. In this manner
the Administrator's burden of proof is remarkably eased and the
burden of going forward shifts to the accused who must overcome
this presumption of carelessness by presentation of reliable, pro-
bative, and substantial evidence.' This doctrine has caused the
FAA to tend to investigate accidents assigned to it only to the
extent necessary to establish a prima facie enforcement case, rather
than to probe deeply enough to establish accurately the probable
cause of the accident based on reliable scientific facts." The prac-
10 Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. S§ 1901-1907 (1976) and
49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) (amended).
"149 C.F.R. S 800 app. (1979).
See generally Mathis, Yodice, and Kovarick, supra note 21.
'Edward C. Bessey, 13 C.A.B. 550 (1952); Charles Robert Sisto, 13 C.A.B.
125, 130 (1948), afl'd, 179 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
41 Administrator v. Lindstam, 41 C.A.B. 841, 842 (1964).
* 14 C.F.R. S 91.9 (1980).
**Administrator v. Davis & Menecke, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1517, 1520-21
(1971).
4 In Administrator v. Hardin, Docket No. SE-3925, NTSB Order No.
EA-1317, slip op. (Aug. 21, 1979), two passenger-carrying air taxi flights
operated by two different companies crashed within a few minutes and a few
miles of each other on the ice of a remote Alaskan bay. Although neither pilot
had any contact with the other between the time of the accident and interviews
by FAA investigators, each related that he was operating by reference to instru-
ments in "white-out" conditions (the loss of visual reference despite visual
meteorological conditions), that he was cruising at an indicated altitude of 500
feet, and that he had flown into the ice without warning with the altimeter still
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tical effect of such slipshod investigation can be to shift the burden
of aircraft accident investigation to the accused, a considerable
disadvantage' to him and contrary to Congressional intent."9
Thus the suspect is faced with another dilemma. If he cooperates
in the reporting and investigation of accidents it is likely that in
so doing he is also assisting the agency in preparing an enforcement
case against him. On the other hand, if he fails or refuses to
cooperate this in itself may give rise to an enforcement action" or
even criminal sanctions. 1 In addition, failure of the suspect to com-
mission a thorough, scientific independent investigation, at his con-
siderable expense, may damn the aviator because of a sloppy
government investigation, caused in part by the Lindstram Doctrine.
B. Accusation
Upon completion of an investigation by the appropriate field
office, the violation report file is forwarded to the FAA Regional
Counsel who institutes a legal proceeding for enforcement (either
by civil penalty or certificate action)." The Regional Counsel sends
indicating that altitude. Although the pilots requested the FAA inspectors to pull
the altimeter from the wreckage and subject them to scientific testing and
although the accident reports suggested a meteorological explanation for the
accidents, the FAA neither inspected the altimeters nor analyzed the local
meteorological conditions during its investigations.
11 In Administrator v. Hardin, Docket No. SE-3925, NTSB Order No. EA-
1317, slip op. (Aug. 21, 1979), the administrative law judge held and the Board
affirmed that the attribution of the accident to altimeter error, either because of
mechanical malfunction or weather phenomenon, is an affirmative defense and
the burden of persuasion is on respondent. Clearly, respondent failed in this
burden. In addition, respondent presented no evidence tending to establish that
the altimeter mechanically malfunctioned prior to impact. Id. at 6.
The Board further stated:
Respondent devotes a considerable portion of his appeal brief to
adequacy of the aircraft accident investigation conducted by the
Board and/or the FAA, particularly with respect to examination
of the altimeter. The instant proceeding, however, is based exclu-
sively on the record herein and cannot be based on, or used as a
forum to collaterally attack, the accident investigation.
Id. slip op. at 6 n.9.
' Compare Administrator v. Simmons, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1122 (1971);
Administrator v. O'Leary, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 913 (1970); Administrator v.
Rapattoni & Swanson, I N. Trans. S. Dec. 241, 245 (1968).
5049 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976).
51 Id. § 1472(g).
9 The investigating field office has authority to dispose administratively of
the case by a "Warning Notice" or a "Letter of Correction." 14 C.F.R. § 13.11
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the accused a letter captioned "Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty"
or "Notice of Proposed Certificate Action" that states the penalty
sought by the FAA." If the FAA has chosen to proceed against the
accused's certificate, the Regional Counsel is required to offer the
accused the opportunity for an informal conference."4 Although not
required by statute, as a practical matter such a conference is also
usually available upon request in a civil penalty action. The con-
ference generally provides an opportunity for plea-bargaining and
some informal discovery. Mitigating circumstances can be pointed
out at the conference." Statements made by the accused at the
conference are generally not used against him at a subsequent
hearing. An important exception, however, does exist. If the
accused's story should change between the time of the informal
conference and the hearing, statements made at the informal con-
ference can be used for impeachment purposes by showing prior
inconsistent statements."
It has been the author's experience with the FAA's new "get
tough" enforcement policy"' that while the informal conferences
were previously a useful settlement tool, they have become less so
today. This is apparently the result of the fact that an insufficient
proportion of those persons accused of violations of the FARs are
now resisting enforcement and carrying appeals to the NTSB " or
forcing the Administrator to resort to the courts." As a result,
there is not the same kind of case load pressure upon FAA at-
torneys as there is upon prosecuting district attorneys, pressure
that results in the compromise settlement of most of their traffic
and criminal cases. Consequently, the FAA is taking full advantage
of the situation. The Administrator is now more inclined to seek
(1980). In the author's experience, these low-level means for resolving contro-
versies have largely fallen into disuse under the "get tough" policy.
- 14 C.F.R. §513.15(b), 13.19(c) (1980).
149 U.S.C. 5 1429(a) (1976).
' See Hamilton, Appellate Practice, supra note 21, at n.33.
"U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., HANDBOOK
2150.2, HANDBOOK FOR HANDLING LEGAL ASPECTS OF FAA ENFORCEMENT PRO-
GRAM § 23 c. (1968, as amended).
1 See notes 22 and 23 supra, and accompanying text.
58 For the procedures involved in appealing certificate actions to the NTSB,
see authorities cited in note 21 supra.
" See authorities cited in note 21 supra (procedures followed in actions to
correct a civil penalty).
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heavier penalties than were previously assessed, and the Regional
Counsel is less inclined to compromise cases. Perhaps the Adminis-
trator's "get tough" policy merits a "get tougher" response from
those suffering the effects, of the policy.
There are so few opportunities for the accused's counsel to have
a real impact on the outcome of the proceedings that special atten-
tion should be paid to possible technical defects existing at the
moment of accusation, particularly where the Administrator has
chosen to proceed against the accused's certificate. Upon receipt
of an order of suspension or revocation, counsel should determine
whether the complaint clearly and unmistakable states a cause of
action6 and whether the accused received timely notice of the basis
for the action.6 In addition, counsel for the Administrator may
make a fatal error early in the prosecution by not timely filing his
complaint with the Board." Defense counsel should compare the
60 If it does not state a cause of action the Administrator's complaint may be
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Administrator v. Choate, Docket
No. SE-3475, NTSB Order No. EA-10011, slip op. (June 1, 1977).
61The so-called "stale complaint rule," 49 C.F.R. § 821.33 (1979), provides
for dismissal in instances where the accused was not put on notice of the in-
vestigation and pending action within six months of the date of the alleged inci-
dent. For examples of the Board's recent treatment of this rule, see Adminis-
trator v. O'Donnell, NTSB Order No. EA-1323, slip op. (Aug. 30, 1979);
Administrator v. Cowell, NTSB Order No. EA-1285 slip op. (May 23, 1979);
Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB Order No. EA-1177, slip op. (Aug. 24, 1978).
62 The Rules of Practice in Air Safety Proceedings provide, at 49 C.F.R.
821.31(a) (1979), that the FAA's counsel must file his order of suspension or
revocation as his complaint within five days after the filing of the notice of
appeal. In his slip opinion of May 13, 1977, in Administrator v. Force, NTSB
Docket No. SE-3536, Chief Administrative Law Judge Boyd noted:
Parenthetically, it should be noted that this office has observed
that in many instances the complaint is not filed even within the
liberalized interpretation that has just been indicated. That is, in
many instances, especially in the last six months, this office has
noticed that the complaint has lagged in many cases several weeks
behind the time in which it should have been filed under the
interpretation five (5) days from notice by us. However, no motion
to dismiss was filed in these instances. But in fairness, this Adminis-
trative Law Judge gives notice that continued late filing of com-
plaints shall in the future be acted upon if meritorious motions are
made on this lack of timeliness. In the circumstances, a copy of this
order shall be served upon all of the counsel for the Administrator
that regularly practice before us in these proceedings.
Id. at 2.
Almost a year later, the full Board in its slip opinion of April 20, 1978, in
Administrator v. Kortum, NTSB Order No. EA-1132, stated:
With respect to the future, however, we believe it would be in-
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date of the filing of the complaint with the date of the filing of his
own appeal. If the rule has not been complied with by the Admin-
istrator, defense counsel should file a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint as not timely filed."
C. Trial Preparation and Discovery
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to adminis-
trative proceedings for certificate actions' and the NTSB Rules of
Practice in Air Safety Proceedings (Rules of Practice)" make little
provision for discovery." In practice, discovery is largely a matter
to be worked out informally between counsel. Consequently, the
results vary between regions, between attorneys in the same region,
and between cases; the only common thread is their unpredict-
ability."' The Rules of Practice provide for application to the ad-
ministrative law judge for orders not specifically provided for by
rule. These may include motions to compel, motions for production
of documents, and other typical civil discovery procedures." The
judge's rulings on such interlocutory motions, however, are not
subject to appeal to the full Board prior to the Board's considera-
tion of the entire proceeding, which occurs subsequent to the
judge's initial decision. In addition, rulings on such motions are not
appropriate to continue in effect a procedure which is not spelled
out in the Board's Rules of Practice and thus which is not officially
noticed to all parties and their representatives appearing before
the Board. Therefore, the Administrator will henceforth be expected
to file his order (as the complaint) within 5 days of receipt of the
notice of appeal whenever a copy thereof has been duly served
upon him (or his representative) by the respondent. In order to
assure uniform compliance with this procedure, a copy of this
decision should be disseminated by the Administrator to all Re-
gional Counsels' offices of the FAA.
Id. at 4.
(349 C.F.R. § 821.17(a) (1979).
"Administrator v. Cockes, 2 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1756, 1758-59 (1975).
549 C.F.R. §§ 821.1-821.63 (1979).
86 A party may request permission from the administrative law judge to take
depositions either upon oral examination or by written interrogatories. Id.
821.19.
7See Administrator v. Lewis, NTSB Order No. EA-1177, slip op. (Aug. 24,
1978); Administrator v. McClain, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1542 (1972); Adminis-
trator v. Sims & McGhee, NTSB Docket Nos. SE-3425 and 3426 (opinion of
Mar. 31, 1977).
6849 C.F.R. § 821.14(a) (1979).
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subject to judicial review." An exception is made in extraordinary
circumstances if the consent of the judge who made the ruling is
obtained."'
It is difficult to imagine any justification for the Board's failure
to provide by rule for customary civil discovery in these actions
or for any clear-cut right to discovery that is not dependent upon
case-by-case exercise of judicial and prosecutorial discretion. This
is especially true since the FAA's statutory investigative powers
give the Administrator virtually unchecked precomplaint discovery,
backed by not only administrative but also criminal sanctions. 1
Yet by comparison those accused must apply to the administrative
law judge for permission to engage in any discovery at all and have
little, if any, meaningful recourse if discovery is refused."
D. Hearing and Adjudication
When the FAA has chosen to act against an accused's certificate,
the only provision for a due process hearing is for the hearing
conducted by the administrative law judge of the NTSB.73 At this
hearing, which is the rough equivalent of a trial in the criminal
context, the Rules of Practice place upon the FAA the burden of
proving the violations charged by a preponderance of substantial,
reliable, and probative evidence." Such a quantum of evidence is
not required in order to establish a prima facie case, however,
which shifts the burden of going forward to the accused, so that
the Administrator's initial burden is negligible."' This is particularly
true since there is no rule excluding hearsay evidence in these pro-
ceedings0 and since the accused enjoys no privilege against being
" McGhee v. NTSB, No. 78-1039 (10th Cir. June 29, 1978) (order dis-
missing appeal).
70 49 C.F.R. § 821.16 (1979).
71 See notes 50 & 51 supra, and accompanying text.
71 See notes 67-70 supra, and accompanying text.
73 For general procedures and considerations in the conduct of these hear-
ings, see Hamilton, Appellate Practice, Mathis, Yodice, and Kovarick, supra
note 21.
7449 C.F.R. §§ 821.32, 821.49(a) (1979).
72 Since the Administrator can satisfy his burden of establishing a prima
facie case exclusively through hearsay evidence, the Administrator's case-in-chief
can (and often does) consist only of the agency investigator's testimony relating
what he was told by others about the incident. See, e.g., Administrator v. Walters,
Docket No. SE-3294, NTSB Order No. EA-963, slip op. at 7 (Feb. 16, 1977).
76 The hearsay nature of such evidence goes only to the weight to be attached
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compelled to testify."
When the time comes to put on the defense, however, we find
that the FAA's Orwellian pigs are again more equal. Although the
FAA may call the accused and his employees and compel their
testimony, it claims the right to prevent the accused from similarly
calling and compelling the testimony of FAA employees." The
Board, in aid of these efforts, has not been willing to exercise its
authority to pursue contempt sanctions"9 when the Administrator
has relied upon these rules to intimidate witnesses and thwart the
Board's own compulsory process. Similarly, the Board has refused
to sustain an administrative law judge's dismissal of the Adminis-
trator's complaint where a pattern of intimidation and resistance
had, in that judge's opinion, operated to effectively deny the
accused due process of law.'"
The Rules of Practice provide counsel the right to submit pro-
posed findings and conclusions, accompanied by supporting rea-
sons, to the judge prior to the initial decision. 1 In the past it was
the practice of the Board to allow these to be submitted in writing
following the hearing and a written decision would be rendered
at a later date." This is no longer a uniform practice; the Board
has held that the rule's requirements are met if the judge simply
to it in the case and not to its admissibility. Administrator v. Trier, 2 N. Trans.
S. Dec. 379 (1973); Petition of Ewing, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1192, 1197 (1971);
Administrator v. Howell, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 943, 944 n.10 (1970). The Board
has also held that hearsay evidence, when not contradicted by direct competent
legal evidence, and even when uncorroborated, is "substantial" evidence within
the meaning of the rule. Administrator v. Ortner, 1 N. Trans. S. Dec. 396, 397
n.5 (1973).
"See Yodice, supra note 21, at 286.
7849 C.F.R. S 9.5 (1979).
-49 U.S.C. 5 1903(b)(3) (1976) provides:
In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena, an order,
or an inspection notice of the Board, or of any duly designated
employee thereof, by any person who resides, is found, or trans-
acts business within the jurisdiction of any district court of the
United States, such district court shall, upon the request of the
Board, have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring
such person to comply forthwith. Failure to obey such an order is
punishable by such court as a contempt of court.
"Administrator v. Sims & McGhee, Docket No. SE-3426, NATS Order No.
EA-1 107, slip op. (Jan. 11, 1978) and NTSB Order No. EA-1069, slip op. (Sept.
9, 1977).
8149 C.F.R. 5 821.39 (1979).
2 Hamilton, Appellate Practice, supra note 21, at 259-60.
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provides for oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing."
E. Full Board Appeal
Even after the administrative law judge renders his initial deci-
sion and order, the accused has not yet exhausted his administrative
remedies that are prerequisites to judicial review; he first must
appeal the order to the full Board." In such an instance, the party
seeking review must give a notice of appeal to the Board within
ten days after an oral or written decision has been rendered." The
timely filing of such a notice of appeal automatically stays the
effectiveness of the initial decision; therefore, the Administrator's
order of suspension or revocation will continue to be stayed and
the accused's certificate will continue in effect during the pendency
of the appeal. ' Generally, an appeal to the full Board is made on
the basis of briefs and the issues are narrow."' The Board has the
power to grant oral arguments on these appeals, but exercises it
83Administrator v. Enright, Docket No. SE-3373, NTSB Order No. EA-0993,
slip op. at 5-6 (April 21, 1977); Administrator v. McElroy, 2 N. Trans. S. Dec.
444 (1973). The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the exclu-
sive province of the administrative law judge, who alone is in a position to
guage the demeanor of the witnesses. Administrator v. Bennie, NTSB Order No.
EA-1047, slip op. (July 25, 1977). Where the judge has made a clear determi-
nation of credibility the Board will not disturb that determination on review.
Administrator v. Sims & McGhee, Docket No. SE-3425 and 3426, NTSB Order
No. EA-1370, slip op. at 10 (Jan. 25, 1980); Administrator v. Utley, Docket
No. SE-3864, NTSB Order EA-1258, slip op. at 4 (Mar. 8, 1979); Adminis-
trator v. Witdfeldt, Docket No. SE-3792, NTSB Order EA-1209, slip op. at 7
(Nov. 2, 1978). "It is the policy of the Board not to disturb credibility findings
except where compelling reasons exist for doing so." Administrator v. Leonhardt,
Docket No. SE-3654, NTSB Order EA-1168, slip op. at 8 n.9 (Aug. 15, 1978),
and cases cited therein. The Board's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive upon the courts of appeals upon judicial review. 49
U.S.C. § 1486(e) (1976).
8449 U.S.C. § 821.47 (1976); McGhee v. N.T.S.B., No. 78-1039 (10th Cir.
June 29, 1978) (order dismissing appeal); Overseas Nat'l Airways v. CAB,
426 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1970); McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961).
-49 C.F.R. S 821.47 (1979).
8 Id. § 821.43.
7 The Board's scope of review is limited by 49 C.F.R. § 821.49 (1979), which
provides that on appeal the Board will consider only the following issues:
(a) Are the findings of fact each supported by a preponderance
of reliable, probative and substantial evidence?
(b) Are conclusions made in accordance with precedent and
policy?
(c) Are the questions on appeal substantial?
(d) Have any prejudicial errors occurred?
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rarely." The Board's unique appellate procedures generally allow
each side only one brief; the appellant typically is not afforded the
opportunity to file a second brief rebutting that filed by the appel-
lee." The full Board's order does constitute a final agency action
that is subject to judicial review." Although either party may peti-
tion the Board to rehear, reconsider, modify, or allow reargument
on its order, the filing of such a petition is neither a prerequisite to
judicial review nor does it toll the statute of limitations for filing
the petition for judicial review."'
F. Judicial Review
Jurisdiction over petitions for review of final Board orders lies
only with the United States Courts of Appeals." Venue is proper
in the circuit of the petitioner's residence or principal place of
business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia."3 The FAA does not have standing to seek judicial
review of the Board's final order; only the respondent may do so.'
Pursuit of judicial review does not automatically stay the effect of
the order of suspension or revocation; therefore, defense counsel
must take affirmative action to secure a stay order at this point
to protect the client's interest.05
0049 C.F.R. § 821.48(g) (1979).
11d. S 821.48(a), (d), (e).
1049 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976).
0149 C.F.R. 5 821.50 (1979); Consolidated Flower Shipments v. CAB,
205 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1953).
9249 U.S.C. 5 1486(a) (1976); Robinson v. Dow, 522 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.
1975).
93 49 U.S.C. 5 1486(b) (1976). Objections to venue may, however, be waived.
Bond v. NTSB, 608 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1979); Panhandle E. Pipe Line
Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 324 U.S. 635 (1945).
04Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
s Application for the stay order pending judicial review is required to be
made first to the Board, if practicable. FED. R. App. P. 18. The Board has
authority to postpone the effective date of its actions, pending judicial review,
upon a finding that justice so requries. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1976). If the Board
denies the motion for a stay order, the court may grant such an order upon a
showing of good cause and after reasonable notice to the Board. 49 U.S.C. §
1486(d) (1976). Where the appellant's qualifications to hold the certificate are
at issue, however, a stay is typically not granted. See, e.g., Administrator v.
Bond, Docket No. SE-3618, NTSB Order No. EA-1138, slip op. (May 5, 1978).
The fact that a stay order has been denied and the period of suspension may
have been completed during the pendency of the judicial review does not render
the case moot since the appellant is entitled to a review of the record of convic-
tion, notwithstanding the fact that he may have already "served his time."
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The Board's findings of fact are binding upon the court upon
review, provided they are supported by substantial evidence."
Although the cases provide a wealth of inspirational verbiage on
the proper application of the substantial evidence test upon judicial
review of agency actions,' it has been the author's experience that
in practice this standard is more often an ineffectual chimera than
a real safeguard." Thus, once the administrative law judge has
9649 U.S.C. § 1486(e) (1976); Aadland v. Butterfield, 502 F.2d 799, 800
(8th Cir. 1974); Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 1973).
'1 Congress has entrusted to the courts of appeals the duty to determine, on
review of adjudicatory proceedings of an administrative agency, whether the
record discloses substantial evidence to support the agency's findings. Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951). This is the only check
provided by law to assure that persons subjected to the punitive actions of
administrative agencies have not suffered administrative sanctions without a
substantial evidentiary showing of good legal cause for the sanctions. The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), requires that the reviewing court
hold unlawful and set aside agency findings that are unsupported by substantial
evidence in cases that are reviewed on the record of an agency hearing, as re-
quired by statute. Reviewing restrictions similar to those found in the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, the Supreme Court, writing in Universal Camera Corp.,
stated: "It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the plain language
of the statutes directs a reviewing court to determine the substantiality of the
evidence on the record .... ." 340 U.S. at 493. More recently, in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1970), the Court
confirmed that this provision of the Administrative Procedure Act requires the
courts of appeals, upon review of agency action, to make a specific finding of
compliance with the standards enumerated in the Act. In Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 66 (1966), the Court held that a court
of appeals, upon its review of administrative agency proceedings, must apply
the test of substantiality to the evidence. In NLRB v. Columbian Enamelling &
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939), the Court, noting that "substantial evidence"
is more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance, stated: "It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as evidence to support
a conclusion .... [E]nough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct
a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the
jury. Id. at 300. The primary responsibility of the court of appeals is applying the
"substantial evidence" test to agency adjudicatory proceedings is to assure that due
process guarantees have been afforded the citizen in order to prevent "rubber-
stamping" of administrative hearings that could allow or encourage such hearings
to deteriorate into mere ritualistic charades. City of Fulton v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 512 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"1 In practice, the "substantial evidence" test is so highly subjective that it
renders the outcome of its application unpredictable. It is a surgical tool the
Court can use in connection with a truly scrutinizing review to arrest the can-
cerous spread of administrative abuses. In current practice, however, the courts
of appeals, harried by staggering case loads, rarely seem willing or able to
invest the time required for such scrutiny. The easier course upon finding some
trace of evidence in the record is to call it substantial and dispose of the appeal
rather than to engage in the kind of meticulous and analytical weighing that,
if thoroughly done, might distinguish the scintilla from the substantial.
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made his findings of fact, particularly where he has couched his
basis for these findings in terms of a credibility choice between
witnesses whose testimony conflicts, there can be little hope for
reversal of those findings at any subsequent stage.0 In addition,
although the Administrative Procedure Act100 specifically provides
for judicial review of the underlying procedural conduct of the
entire administrative appeal process to assure compliance with the
requisites of due process, the courts have granted such deference
to the propriety of agencies' procedures that the agencies need
rarely fear penetrating scrutiny by the reviewing court.'
The Federal Aviation Act clearly empowers the court upon
review to affirm, modify, or set aside the agency's order, in whole
or in part, and, if necessary, to order further proceedings by the
Board or Administrator.' The courts, however, have character-
ized the Board's selection of a penalty as more a matter of discre-
tion than of precedent and have shown a marked reluctance to
modify penalties imposed by the Board even where such penalties
were in excess of those imposed previously for similar violations."
" See note 85 supra, and accompanying text. In one recent case, involving
a charge that the pilot had flown too low at night over a sparsely-populated
rural area, the only evidence whether the pilot had in fact operated within 500
feet of persons and homes in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(c) was the testi-
mony of two housewives who made no estimate of the aircraft's proximity but
merely related their hysterical reactions to the aircraft's passage and their
wonder, on the following day, how the aircraft had missed some power lines
in the area. The pilot and one of his passengers testified that at no time was
he within 500 feet of the houses. The administrative law judge couched his
initial decision in credibility terms, finding for the FAA. Administrator v. Terry,
NTSB Docket No. SE-3556 (Oct. 4, 1977). Although defense counsel on appeal
to the full Board carefully couched his arguments in terms of the substantiality
of the evidence, even if the credibility of the government's witnesses was un-
impeached, the Board found that the judge's finding of a violation "rested
squarely on a credibility choice between conflicting testimony" and therefore
deferred to the judge's finding. Docket No. SE-3556, NTSB Order No. EA-1106
(Jan. 23, 1978). On judicial review defense counsel beseeched the court of
appeals to review the evidence to determine its substantiality. The court found the
evidence substantial and affirmed the Board's order suspending the pilot's com-
mercial certificate. Terry v. NTSB, 608 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1979).
105 U.S.C. 551-559 (1976).
10149 U.S.C. 5 1486 (1976). See 5 U.S.C. §5 551-559 (1976).
10249 U.S.C. S 1486(d) (1976).
103 Historically, precedent has played a strong role in the Board's review of
the propriety of the sanctions sought by the FAA in each particular case. See,
e.g., Administrator v. Johnson, 2 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1598, 1600 (1975). Escala-
tion of sanctions above precedential levels appears to bg a part of the FAA's
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Although the judgment and decree of the court of appeals is subject
to further review by the Supreme Court of the United States, this
is available only upon certification or by the granting of a writ of
certiorari,"' a highly improbable event.
G. Extraordinary Remedies
Under some circumstances the FAA is empowered to suspend
or revoke a certificate without prior notice or hearing." Such
"emergency orders" take effect immediately and the filing of an
appeal with the NTSB does not stay the effectiveness of the order
pending a hearing."N The Administrator's decision to invoke the
emergency authority has been held not subject to review."°' The
Rules of Practice, however, do provide for accelerated pleading
and hearing procedures in emergency cases.' 0' Although the Ad-
ministrator historically has used the emergency power quite spar-
ingly, ' initial indications are that it is now being relied upon
more frequently and with less hesitation as a part of the "get tough"
policy.110
The FAA's decision to proceed under its emergency authority
may throw the accused and his counsel onto the horns of another
dilemma if the accused individual or business relies upon its cer-
tificate authority in order to earn its income. In fact, the Adminis-
trator's decision to resort to the emergency authority may dispose
of the case for all practical purposes. This is because counsel
"get tough" policy. See notes 22 & 23 supra. If the Board goes along with this
trend, precedent effectively flies out the window since it has been held that the
agencies exercise a broad discretion in imposing sanctions and that the sanctions
should not be overturned on judicial review unless they are unwarranted in
law or without justification in fact. Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co.,
411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973); French v. CAB, 378 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1967);
Nadiak v. CAB, 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913
(1963). The fact that the severity of the sanctions is greater than that of sanc-
tions that have been imposed in similar cases does not render them unwarranted
in law or without justification in fact. Terry v. NTSB, 608 F.2d 418 (10th
Cir. 1979). See also Barnum v. NTSB, 595 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
10449 U.S.C. § 1486(f) (1976).
10549 U.S.C. S 1485 (1976).
100 Administrator v. Metro Air System, Inc., 2 N. Trans. S. Dec. 285 (1973).
107 Administrator v. Harvey, I N. Trans. S. Dec. 1450, 1452 (1972).
1-s49 C.F.R. §§ 821.54-.57 (1979). The Board is required to finally dispose
of such an appeal within sixty days. 49 U.S.C. S 1429(a) (1976).
109 See Kovarick, supra note 21, at 24.
110 See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
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defending an emergency certificate action must make an unpleasant
choice. He may press the client's rights to an expedited hearing
under the rules, but his hearing preparation will be hampered by
having less than a week to complete as much discovery as possible.
He must then try the case whether he is ready or not fully prepared.
On the other hand, counsel may elect to waive the expedited hear-
ing procedures and attempt to prepare an adequate defense while
the suspension of his client's operations continues. This may effec-
tively drive the client out of business during the pendency of the
appeal.
H. Summary Seizure of Aircraft
Another weapon in the Administrator's enforcement arsenal that
formerly was relied upon sparingly is the authority to seize sum-
marily the accused's aircraft and hold it as security for satisfaction
of a potential civil penalty.11' This may also become a commonly-
used weapon under the "get tough" policy. When the summary
seizure of an accused's aircraft accompanies emergency action
against the accused's certificate this may be, for all practical pur-
poses, the coup de grace, since without the aircraft or his certificate
the accused will likely have no means to pay for his defense.
I. Injunctive Relief
Historically, injunctive relief has been sought successfully by the
government only in controversies arising out of compliance or non-
compliance with the FARs."' With the FAA taking an increasingly
adversarial and belligerent stance toward certificate-holders and
applicants, counsel representing members of the aviation industry
may find it necessary to resort to petitions for injunctive relief on
behalf of their clients. This may be particularly necessary where
the Administrator effectively precludes or interferes with the ac-
cused's operations without resorting to formal enforcement proce-
11149 U.S.C. §5 1471(b), 1473(b) (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 13.17 (1980).
There is some question regarding the constitutionality of these provisions and
the decisions on point are in conflict. Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F.
Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1974), held the provisions constitutional, but more recently
United States v. Vertol H21C, 545 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1976), found the pro-
visions unconstitutional as a denial of due process. Each of these cases involved
the summary seizure of a helicopter allegedly being operated commercially in
violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations. See Hamilton, Appellate Practice,
supra note 21, at 263.
112 See Hamilton, Appellate Practice, supra note 21, at 264.
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dures that would give rise to a right to the due process hearing
and subsequent appeals.'13
II. MEDICAL CASES
Although there has been much less sound and fury in the area of
medical cases than in the area of enforcement, there have been
some notable developments. In virtually simultaneous rulings, three
United States Courts of Appeals agreed that the denial of a pilot's
petition for exemption from an FAR is subject to judicial review,
but that the test upon review is whether the denial was arbitrary
and capricious, thus constituting an abuse of discretion. In these
cases the courts found that the Administrator's blanket policy of
refusing to grant exemptions from the "Age 60 Rule"" ' was not an
abuse of discretion."'
The administrative law judge's initial decision and order in cases
reviewing the denial, suspension, or revocation of a medical cer-
tificate most often turns upon a credibility choice between the
airman's physician expert witnesses and those testifying for the
FAA. Thus, the factors guiding the judge in making his credibility
choices have been the subject of many Board pronouncements of
increasing sophistication. Basically, in balancing conflicting opin-
ions of expert medical witnesses the judge should follow the opinion
that he finds more persuasive, logical, and in-depth."6 The testimony
of the attending physician may be entitled to some additional
weight, however, especially when the precise diagnosis is not as
complete as it could be and when the attending physician must be
relied upon to testify concerning the airman's medical condition."'
In practice, the evidence includes not only the testimony of medi-
cal experts but also the documentary history of the airman's medical
condition. Greater weight is given to the testimony of an acknowl-
"'See, e.g., Baltic Aviation, Inc. v. Bond, No. 79-C-677 (D. Colo., June 11,
1979) (temporary restraining order).
14 14 C.F.R. S 121.383(c) (1980).
"5Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979); Rombough v. FAA,
594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979); Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978).
11 Petition of Evans, 2 N. Trans. S. Dec. 2299, 2300 (1976); Petition of
Wittmaack, 2 N. Trans. S. Dec. 1011 (1975); Petition of Ewing, 1 N. Trans. S.
Dec. 1192, 1196 (1971).
"1 Petition of Bank, Docket No. SM-1792, NTSB Order No. EA-1094, slip
op. (Dec. 13, 1977).
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edged medical expert who testifies at the hearing and is subject to
cross-examination than is given to written reports that are incon-
clusive or are subject to interpretation."'
The FAA continues to argue that the question on review is not
whether the airman is medically qualified for certification at the
time of the hearing but is only whether he was qualified at the time
of the FAA's denial. This argument was recently rejected at the
trial level in a rather colorful initial decision issued by Adminis-
trative Law Judge Thomas W. Reilly in Petition of Spivey:
It would seem that only a scenario from a Franz Kafka novel
about the impenetrable never-yielding bureaucratic maze would
dictate that a pilot, who has clear evidence prior to a hearing that
he is no longer an "unacceptable risk to air safety" and that there
is now no longer a reasonable expectation of heart attack in the
next 2 years, must nevertheless hold his tongue at that hearing,
dare not mention such evidence, but must first lose this hearing and
then reapply to that Great Bureaucracy to start the wheels rolling
again so he can introduce such evidence at his later (2nd) hearing
some 2 or 3 years down the road. This simplistic recipe for frustra-
tion and endless gamemanship may prove amusing to overworked
Government lawyers who would like to dissuade taxpayers from
continuing to press for their rights, but it is a shabby way to treat
American citizens who expect more from their favorite bureauc-
racy. A taxpayer's individual resources are very limited in duel-
ing with the Government, while the Government's, of course, are
endless (it has the combined taxpayers' money). In recognition
of this imbalance in resources, the taxpayer (pilot) should be
allowed to put his best foot forward, once and for all, at the hear-
ing, his "day in court," and not be told he must save (ignore) his
best evidence for some other hearing 2 or 3 years hence. . . . it
seems absurd to insist that the trier of the facts close his eyes to
a nearly 10-month time lapse with a positive test at the end of
that time, and look only at an earlier 2-1/2 month test (and be
suspicious of its prognosis implications because it is ONLY 2-1/2
months). I am sure that the Federal Air Surgeon is not so sensi-
tive as to be seriously embarrassed because his good faith decision
made a year and a half ago has been proven to be obsolete and
overtaken by events, the passage of time, and much later testing
of the patient. He does not take delight in permanently grounding
pilots unnecessarily. On the contrary, like any physician, surely
he welcomes news of a patient clearly establishing substantial re-
"I Petition of Wilhem, Docket No. SM-1641, NTSB Order No. EA-1074,
slip op. (Sept. 27, 1977).
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covery and a radically-improved prognosis for the future. Fur-
thermore, this is the Petitioner's appeal, not the Federal Air
Surgeon's-so this is not simply an academic exercise designed
to tally how many times the Federal Air Surgeon was right when
he uttered decisions a year or two ago.'19
The Board has amended its Rules of Practice relating to medical
cases to provide that where the airman is simultaneously pursuing
both an appeal of the denial of the certificate to the Board and a
petition for exemption to the Federal Air Surgeon, he may request
that the Board hold his petition for review in abeyance pending
final action on his petition for exemption, or for 180 days from the
date of issuance of the Administrator's denial, whichever occurs
first."' The airman's counsel should be alert to the fact that if such
a delay is requested and counsel fails to request a hearing during




Although the FAA admits that there is really no such thing as a
"disqualifying medication,.' 2. it continues to deny issuance of avia-
tion medical certificates based on the airman's "use of a disqualify-
ing medication."...3 In one recent case the airman's perspicacious
neurologist observed in his report:
The sweet irony of this whole kind of problem is that if the patient
were to take adequate doses of anticonvulsants such as Dilantin,
the chance of his having another seizure, even under extenuating
circumstances of physical or mental fatigue would be almost in-
finitesimal. In other words in order to get his flying license the
patient can't take any medication, but if he were able to take
medication, he would certainly be safe to fly."'
"' Docket No. SM-2352, 11-3 (December 6, 1979).
-2049 C.F.R. § 821.24(d) (1979).
1 Id.
1ZLetter from Audie W. Davis, Chief Aeromedical Certification Branch,
Civil Aeromedical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration to J. Scott Hamil-
ton (Nov. 16, 1977).
" Letter from Audie W. Davis, Chief Aeromedical Certification Branch,
Civil Aeromedical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration to George Lebsack
(Dec. 27, 1979).
"I Letter from Robert H. Colfelt, M.D., Seattle Neurological Clinic to I.
Scott Hamilton (July 3, 1979).
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III. CONCLUSION
The woeful state of the current procedures followed in enforce-
ment cases was perhaps most eloquently summarized by an airman
who, proceeding pro se, complained to the FAA prosecutor that
"I feel like I have been unduly processed."'" Indeed, the present
system is more like a formal and ritualistic "processing" than an
effort to discover the truth while respecting the individual's dignity
and autonomy in the face of accusations by the federal government.
If these matters are to be denominated "civil" so as to deny the
accused the rights attendant to those accused of crimes, then the
accused should at least be afforded the ordinary concomitants of
due process in civil litigation, including the rights to liberal dis-
covery and to compel the government's own employee witnesses to
appear for confrontation and cross-examination. The present sys-
tem simply affords the accused the worst of both the criminal and
civil worlds, a shameful and intolerable situation.
There is no longer predictability or uniformity in the imposition
of sanctions in these cases and this too does not appear justifiable.
Most states long ago resorted to "point systems" in order to achieve
uniformity in the penalization of terrestrial traffic offenders. In such
systems the law typically provides for the assessment of a certain
number of points for each regulatory violation and then prescribes
what accumulation of points shall result in the suspension or
revocation of the driver's certificate."' The adoption of a similar
system by the FAA to penalize violations of the FARs would go far
toward assuring equal sanctions for equal misdeeds.
The United States Courts of Appeals should refrain from grant-
ing an unearned presumption of rectitude to the Board's delibera-
tive process and should scrutinize these cases more closely on judi-
cial review in order to distinguish between the realities of due pro-
cess and empty, formalistic rituals that masquerade as due process.
Counsel for the appellants from such governmental prosecution
should aid the courts in recognizing these distinctions.
121 Carl Schellenberg, FAA Great Lakes Regional Counsel, related this anec-
dote from his earlier experiences as a trial attorney with the FAA's Rocky
Mountain Region. Conversation with Carl Schellenberg in Aurora, Colorado
(Summer, 1977).
126 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. S 42-2-123 (Supp. 1978).
